http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/64460/index.do 
Vivaconcept International Inc. v. The Queen*[1] (October 24, 2013) involved a claim for a refund of GST that had been remitted by the appellant in respect of supplies to a client but that had proven to be uncollectible because of the client’s subsequent insolvency:
26. On January 14, 2009, an agreement to forgive the debt was signed by the appellant and Flora.
27. On January 14, 2009, the appellant issued a credit note to Flora relative to the debt cancelled in its favour.
28. In its net tax return for the period ending January 31, 2009, signed on April 20, 2009, the appellant claimed an adjustment in the amount of $103,440.44.10
29. On August 5, 2009, the Minister determined that the appellant was not entitled to the adjustment amount requested, which represented the GST charged but not collected,
on the ground that a credit note was not issued to Flora within a reasonable time.
[Emphasis added, footnotes omitted]
Thus the entire issue in this appeal turned on whether the January 14, 2009 credit note was issued within a reasonable time. The court concluded that it had been and allowed the appeal:
[53] In this case, it is not disputed that a credit note was issued. Indeed, it was admitted that a valid credit note was issued on January 14, 2009. The problem lies primarily with the time period: 23 months passed between the agreement to reduce consideration (in February 2007) and the issuing of the credit note (January 2009). Determining whether a time period is reasonable is not essentially an exercise in mathematics; a myriad of considerations and elements must be assessed on the basis of the context and of the circumstances.
[54] At least, that is what Justice Muldoon specified in
Silden v. The Queen. The issue of a reasonable time must also be assessed on the basis of the obvious objective of Parliament, which intended that a recipient of the supply may correct or rectify the situation with regard to the very numerous uncertainties of business and economic operations.
[55] It is true that a time period of 23 months is relatively long. However, the appellant believed that section 231 was the one that applied in his case; that section does not require a credit note. It learned only at the end of 2008 that it should have used section 232 and that it should therefore have issued a credit note to Flora.
[Translation]
24. That final decision was communicated to the appellant around the end of 2008 through various discussions with, among others, Alain Muguet, auditor for the Agence du revenu du Québec.
[56] The credit note was issued on January 14, 2009, that is, a relatively short time after the appellant learned that it should have issued one. The adjustment request under section 232 was then made on April 20, 2009, in its net tax return for the period ending on January 31, 2009.
[Translation]
28. In its net tax return for the period ending January 31, 2009, signed on April 20, 2009, the appellant requested an adjustment in the amount of $103,440.44.10
[57] The appellant has shown diligence, particularly if we take into account the provisions in section 231; the time resulting from the request under section 231 must be taken into account. The remaining time, namely, that between the Minister’s notice of disallowance (end of 2008) and the issuance of the credit note (January 2009) seems quite reasonable to me.
[58] The appellant has shown diligence; indeed, citing the provisions in section 231 at first was an unavoidable step because the appellant could have received satisfaction at that time. Indeed, the write-off of the debt and the payment of the net tax could have very well satisfied the appellant in that first step.
[59] I do not believe that I am exaggerating when I state that some provisions of the Act are particularly difficult to understand for those who are subject to them. In this regard, the respondent’s representatives have some responsibility to make the provisions more accessible to the general public so that those who are subject to them may manage their tax obligations properly.
[60] In this case, there is no doubt that the appellant acted in good faith and reasonably given the circumstances. In such a context, I am of the view that, unless there is a doubt or a certain degree of discomfort regarding the balance of probabilities, the decision should be in favour of the taxpayer, especially since the blame directed at it has much more to do with form than with substance.
[61] In this case, I believe that the evidence is satisfactory for allowing the appeals; therefore, they are allowed, with costs to the appellant.
[Footnote omitted]
[1] 2013 TCC 336.